1 However, notwithstanding increased scrutiny by media, regulators, and legislators, the academic evidence on whether shareholder governance actually limits bank risk is not convincing.
Leading examples of this literature are Beltratti and Stulz (2012) who actually show that banks with more shareholder-friendly boards performed worse during the crisis than other banks, and Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) who nd no evidence that better-aligned equity incentives are related to better shareholder performance for banks during the nancial crisis.
If anything, Fahlenbrach and Stulz nd the contrary.
These results are not surprising from a theoretical perspective since bank shareholders worry about executives taking too little risk. By preventing underinvestment, contingent stock-based and options-based compensation create shareholder value by encouraging managers to increase volatility (Guay (1999) ). Therefore, bank executives may have suered great losses during the crisis and acted in the best interest of their shareholders (see Cheng et al. (2012) for empirical evidence in support of this view).
What has received much less attention in previous literature are agency problems between managers and other investors such as debtholders. Equity-based incentives encourage the shifting of risk to debtholders, so that shareholders do not bear the full losses from the downside of the corporation's risk-taking (Jensen and Meckling (1976) ; Bolton et al. (2010)). These risk-inducing eects are reduced by debt-based compensation such as dened benet pensions and deferred compensation (inside debt), which consists of the promise of xed sums of cash in the future. Because such commitments are unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the rm, executives would stand in line with other unsecured creditors in the event of default (Sundaram and Yermack (2007) ). The idea that managers with debt-based incentives manage their rms more conservatively is formalized by Edmans and Liu (2011) .
Using a sample of CEOs and CFOs from small and large U.S.-listed banks, this study examines whether variations in inside debt are associated with meaningful dierences in bank risk during the 2007-2009 nancial crisis. While risk is typically dened from the perspective of shareholders, this paper takes the perspective of both shareholders and debtholders. This seems useful for banks that are funded primarily by depositors and other debtholders and much less by shareholder capital, and build their business around debt and credit. The importance of leverage in banks causes debt agency problems to be particularly severe within banks. Since market assessments of debtholder risk can only be observed directly for about twenty of the very largest banks that have publicly traded debt instruments, this study describes bank shareholder and debtholder risk using tail risk. The idea is that the lower tail of the stock returns distribution represents problems that are shared by both shareholders and debtholders. The paper also investigates the link between inside debt and several policy mechanisms that are unique to banks and generally considered important in the recent nancial crisis.
Consistent with theoretical predictions, the results indicate that banks with larger inside debt holdings at the end of 2006 have lower risk exposures from July 1, 2007 , to March 31, 2009 , in terms of lost stock market value, return volatility, and tail risk. Furthermore, inside debt is associated with more conservative investment decisions (i.e., a smaller fraction of nonperforming real estate and asset writedowns), more conservative nancing decisions (i.e., less short-term market borrowing to fund bank assets in the run-up to the crisis), and more conservative business decisions (i.e., a smaller fraction of nontraditional banking activities). Collectively, the results indicate that inside debt holdings limit bank risk by encouraging more conservative decision-making. The negative relation between inside debt and bank risk remains strong after controlling for survivorship bias and a series of variables.
Throughout the paper, untabulated analyses verify that the negative relation is robust to several denitions of inside debt and bank risk; at the executive level and the rm level; across bank risk denitions in levels or rst dierences; across several tail risk thresholds; before and after winsorizing; and either with or without systemically important banks. Although the sample has relatively few observations, the results are conrmed by an instrumental variable analysis and extend to a sample of CEOs and CFOs with and without any inside debt.
An illustration of the main result can be seen in Figure 1 , which represents bank risk conventionally in terms of lost equity market value. Banks are sorted into three portfolios according to their relative inside debt holdings in 2006, and the graph shows how stock market losses evolve for portfolios 1 and 3.
2 The notable features in the gure are that banks with low levels of inside debt gained signicantly more market value before the crisis, but also lost signicantly more during the crisis. It can also be seen that low-inside debt banks lost ground both faster and earlier over the crisis period examined in this study.
Banks with high levels of inside debt seem to have retained much of their market value until the Lehman collapse caused problems to spread across the entire nancial sector. Figure 1 illustrates the central claim of this paper that large inside debt holdings encourage managers to act conservatively, resulting in lower risk and smaller losses during the crisis. This paper's focus on debt-based compensation adds to recent work that studies the role of non-debt incentives and risk-taking in the nancial sector's problems (e.g., Cheng et al. (2012) ; Balachandran et al. (2010) ; Bennett et al. (2012) ; Chesney et al. (2012); DeYoung et al. (2013) ; Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) ), in particular when it comes to risk-shifting 2 Specically, the portfolios are constructed by cutting the sample at the 30th and 70th percentile according to the earliest available inside debt ratio in December 2006. Next, bank stocks are sorted into the rst and third quantiles to create a High inside debt portfolio and a Low inside debt portfolio. problems (e.g., Chesney et al. (2012) ). Furthermore, several contributions are made to the literature on inside debt. First, most previous work has only examined the impact of inside debt within non-nancial rms 3 , and this study on the nancial sector examines a particularly clear and important case of risk-taking by identifying several risk-taking mechanisms unique to the nancial sector. Second, this paper contributes to currently existing working papers on inside debt and bank risk (e.g., Tung and Wang (2010); Bennett et al. (2012) ) by its attempts to address empirical issues related to attrition bias, selection bias, and identication problems arising from the endogenous nature of compensation, and by examining CEO and CFO incentives. CFO incentives are arguably more important in specialized decisionmaking such as bank risk management (Chava and Purnanandam (2010) ; Anantharaman and Lee (2013) ). Third, exploring the market implications of debt-based pay during the recent nancial crisis leads to new insights. While previous studies demonstrate that debtbased pay generally leads to lower equity returns under normal economic conditions (Wei and Yermack (2011)), the results in this paper suggest that it also moderates losses under adverse economic conditions. Finally, the results presented in this study have strong implications for the broader issue of how to best regulate compensation within nancial institutions. Specically, it adds to previous work that oers several solutions to shift compensation away from equity-based incentives (e.g., John et al. (2000) ; Bebchuk and Spamann (2010) ; Bolton et al. (2010); Carpenter et al. (2011) ). It is true that the results do not say anything about whether banks should limit risks or pursue high returns from a societal point of view, and do not justify any welfare claims. However, if the purpose is to limit risk, then the public discussion about aligning managerial incentives could benet from considering debt-based compensa-3 After the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted new rules in 2007 that required disclosure about dened benet pensions and deferred compensation, several studies found that inside debt reduces the agency problem of debt. For instance, inside debt has been associated with more favorable debt contracts (Anantharaman et al. (2010); Wang et al. (2010) ), more conservative nancial and investment policies (Cassell et al. (2012) ), less restrictive covenants in debt contracting (Chen et al. (2010) ; Anantharaman et al. (2010); Wang et al. (2010) ; ), more prudent accounting (Chen et al. (2010); Wang et al. (2010) ), diversifying acquisitions (Liu and Mauer (2012) ), and higher bond prices (Wei and Yermack (2011) ).
tion. More specically, the reforms mentioned in Footnote 1 indicate that a widespread assumption gained ground that risks will be more eectively monitored once more power is assigned to shareholders. However, the results in this paper suggest that, for the purpose of limiting risk, power should be shifted to debtholders rather than shareholders.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains how the data and variables in this study are constructed and describes the empirical model. Section 3 describes how inside debt contracts in 2006 aect bank risk in [2007] [2008] [2009] . Section 4 examines the several risk-taking policies through which bank managers can manage their rms more conservatively. Section 5 presents attempts to alleviate concerns about endogeneity and selection bias. Section 6 concludes.
Data and variables
The construction of the data starts with collecting information on all nancial institutions (i.e., rms with Standard Industry Classication (SIC) codes between 6000 and 6300) among the largest 3000 U.S. companies, which represent approximately 98% of the investable U.S.
equity market. The compensation data of these companies are obtained from Equilar, an executive compensation data rm, and hand-collected whenever necessary. Compared to 129 of the very largest banks that are S&P 1500 member and analyzed in most studies, this number almost quadruples to an initial list of 542 eligible nancial institutions. 
2.1
Measuring inside debt Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that when an executive's D/E ratio is similar to that of the rm, she would have no incentives to transfer wealth from debtholders to equityholders because the reallocation would have no eect on the value of her holdings in the rm. More recently, Edmans and Liu (2011) show that increases in the value of a CEO's inside debt lead to conservative investment choices, which in turn lead to increases (decreases) in the value of the rm's debt (equity). Therefore, inside debt holdings are generally measured by the debt-to-equity (D/E) ratio of CEO wealth that is invested in the rm, relative to that of the rm. I follow Edmans and Liu (2011) who derive the following inside debt ratio:
where inside debt (D I ) comprises the present value from accumulated pension benets (P ension) and the scal year-end balance non-qualied deferred compensation (N QDC), VaR (Guldimann et al. (1994) ) is a widely used quantity for corporate control as it focuses on the largest likely loss. Given a probability level α that indicates the dierence between likely and extreme loss, VaR is dened as the maximum (rm-wide) loss in 100(1 − α)% of the time:
where R it is rm i's return at time t, and z is a percentile corresponding to the pre-specied parameter α. Since risk is calculated ex post, it is straightforward to obtain 100(1 − α)% (Artzner et al. (1999) ) gives a better impression of the worst 100α% of the cases by describing the mean of the lower tail of the returns distribution:
This denition can be interpreted as the average loss suered in the worst 100α% of the time.
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) demonstrate that losses might also occur because other institutions face similar constraints at the same time. This is important to the 2007-2009 crisis:
many banks could no longer roll over their short-term debt in 2008, which is considered a direct consequence of sector-wide increased margin and collateral requirements and a general tightening of lending (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2008 
In words, CoVaR measures the sensitivity of overall exposure to losses from other nancial rms by calculating the value-at-risk of a stock, given that the industry return is below its 100α-th percentile. Survivorship bias Since market assessments of debtholder risk can only be observed directly for about twenty of the very largest banks that have publicly traded debt instruments, bank shareholder and debtholder risk is measured using stock returns. However, of the 319 banks in the sample, about 17% was acquired by other rms, or delisted due to a violation of listing requirements or bankruptcy. Table A1 shows how many banks survived, entered bankruptcy, merged, or were acquired during the sample period. Consequently, the possibility exists that banks with large inside debt holdings may seemingly fare better during the crisis, simply because I ignore other banks that got into trouble and disappeared from the sample.
To alleviate this concern, I make use of CRSP's delisting prices. If a security is removed from the exchange, CRSP calculates its price after delisting from an o-exchange price or bid-ask spread (i.e., the average of the bid and ask quotes), and the sum of a series of distribution payments. Hence, returns from delisted rms can be calculated using the share price on December 29, 2006, and the delisting price on the date of delisting. If banks are near bankruptcy when they delist or are taken over, returns are near -100% and are captured by VaR, ES, CoVaR, and volatility. However, if healthy banks are taken over, the delisting return includes the takeover premium paid by the acquirer. Thus, bank risk only increases when banks delist or are taken over due to bankruptcy.
Empirical model
To 
where Y i,M ar09 is bank risk represented by stock market losses, volatility, VaR, ES, CoVaR, and the probability of nancial distress 8 ; D i,Dec06 is inside debt as measured by the k−ratio;
X i,Dec06 is a collection of control variables measured at the end of 2006, and ε i,M ar09 is an error term that is adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Since prior work suggests that CFO incentives are arguably more important for decisions that require specialized knowledge such as bank risk management (Chava and Purnanandam (2010) ; Anantharaman and Lee (2013)), I report results on both CEO and CFO incentives.
9 I follow the previous literature on inside debt (e.g., Cassell et al. (2012) ) and report p-values that are two-tailed except for the variables of interest, D i,Dec06 . I discuss the endogeneity issues related to this empirical setup in Section 5.
Since bank risk during the crisis can be aected by many factors, a variety of control variables is included (see Table 1 for their denitions). First, I include equity delta and equity vega since equity incentives and debt incentives are likely to be set simultaneously, and shareholders implement compensation policies that have a positive eect on rm risk (e.g., Jensen and Murphy (1990); Guay (1999) ). Second, I include total annual compensation since riskier rms may need to pay their managers more if managerial eort is more dicult to monitor (Prendergast (2002) ), managers have a stronger inuence in riskier rms (Cheng et al. (2012) ), and it is more dicult for riskier rms to attract optimal talent (Edmans and Gabaix (2011)). At the same time, high levels of pay may also indicate entrenchment problems as in Bebchuk et al. (2002) , and indicate weak corporate governance. Third, rm size and market-to-book are canonical determinants of future returns that also aect risk (Coles et al. (2006) ) and compensation (Gabaix and Landier (2008) 
10
The mean leverage ratio equals 0.83, but varies between 0.55 and 0.95. The average Tier-1 capital ratio of 11% indicates that the banks are well-capitalized, although the sample contains four banks with a Tier-1 capital ratio below the regulatory minimum of 4%. Mean (median) survivorship-adjusted buy-and-hold returns around the crisis period are -53% (-57%) and vary widely from -100% to +67%. Average annualized volatility over 2006 is 23% and increases dramatically to 80% during the crisis.
Panel B of Table 1 The median inside CEO (CFO) D/E ratio is 0.12 (0.10), but the incentives from inside debt vary widely across executives. For example, several banks have outside debt amounting to less than 0.3% of equity value, which leads to very large inside debt ratios. Following conventions in the literature, I apply a log transformation to the k-ratio and winsorize at the 2.5th and 97.5th percentile.
11 The median k-ratio for CEOs (for CFOs) is e −1.07 = 0.34 (2012)).
Panel C of Table 1 presents correlations between inside debt and control variables to check for collinearity issues. For instance, leverage is a key variable in banking but also implicitly captured by the k-ratio, and total annual compensation correlates strongly with bank size (Gabaix and Landier (2008) ). The correlation between inside debt and leverage is around 0.3, and correlations are quite high between book-to-market and leverage (0.62), and rm size and total annual compensation (0.84). Hence, I repeat the analyses below after excluding leverage and total annual compensation from the regressions, which further improves results (see the online appendix). However, even though collinearity problems results in larger standard errors, the coecients on total annual compensation and leverage are highly signicant in the regressions below. Furthermore, leverage is a key variable in any study on banks. Therefore, I include these variables in the main text.
11 The results that follow are similar without log-transformations and winsorizing.
Inside debt and bank shareholders in 2007-2009
The majority of studies examining rm risk focus on shareholder risk. Therefore, I rst examine the impact of inside debt on shareholder losses and shareholder risk before turning to an examination of total (i.e., shareholder and debtholder) bank risk.
Inside debt and shareholder losses Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 The coecient on inside debt is negative and statistically signicant for CEOs and CFOs (p < 0.01), indicating that banks with larger inside debt holdings suered smaller stock market losses during the crisis after controlling for other return drivers. The coecient on log total compensation is signicant for CEOs (p < 0.05) but not for CFOs, in favor of stories on CEO entrenchment (as in Bebchuk et al. (2002) ) or stories that higher CEO pay is optimal for riskier nancial rms (as in Cheng et al. (2012) ). The coecient on log equity market value is signicant only for the larger sample of CEOs, which has more variation in market capitalizations. The negative coecient on CEO equity delta appears in contrast with Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) who nd a negative relation between stock performance and the CEO's shares and options owned as a fraction of shares outstanding.
Unreported results conrm the negative relation in Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) when using their measure. Other important control variables are ROA (p < 0.10) and market leverage (p < 0.01).
The economic importance of inside debt can be assessed using Panel B of Table 1, which shows that the standard deviation of the k-ratio equals 2.19 for CEOs (2.08 for CFOs).
Therefore, a one-standard deviation increase in the k-ratio is associated with a loss that is 2.19 × 3.650 = 8.0 percent (2.08 × 3.745 = 7.8 percent) lower during the 21-month crisis period. This is equivalent to an average annualized dierence of 8.0 12/21 = 3.3 percent (7.8 12/21 = 3.2 percent) per crisis year.
These wealth losses by bank shareholders complement previous empirical ndings that more inside debt is generally associated with lower returns. For instance, Wei and Yermack (2011) nd that more inside debt is generally associated with lower stock returns during non-crisis times, whereas the negative coecients on inside debt in Table 2 indicate that inside debt has also limited stock market losses during crisis times.
Inside debt and shareholder risk It is dicult to discuss bank risk without looking at volatility. One reason for this is that, strictly speaking, VaR, ES, and CoVaR do not measure risk: If the full distribution of returns moves to the left, then both expected returns and returns in the tails will be lower. Therefore, I investigate whether idiosyncratic, systematic, and total volatility are lower for banks that issue more inside debt. Idiosyncratic risk is the standard deviation of daily residuals from the Fama-French three-factor model. Systematic risk is the standard deviation of the tted values from the three-factor model.
In Columns 3-8 of Table 2 , the coecients on CEO and CFO inside debt suggest a negative and highly signicant eect on total volatility and idiosyncratic volatility. CEO equity delta is negatively related to total volatility (as in, e.g., Lambert and Larcker (1987) and Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) ) and idiosyncratic volatility (as in, e.g., Jin (2002) ).
Coecients on CEO and CFO equity vega are insignicant as in Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) . As before, the coecients on total annual compensation are signicant for CEOs but less so for CFOs. on ES complement those on VaR by suggesting that, given that an extremely negative shock materializes, the average exposure is lower for banks with higher levels of inside debt.
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 3 show the impact of inside debt on banks' vulnerability to the spreading of losses captured by CoVaR. The coecients on log equity market value are signicantly positive suggesting that being too-interconnected-to-fail (e.g., Brunnermeier
and Adrian (2009) is an important determinant of total bank risk.
To tackle these concerns, I use a probit model that captures the probability of nancial distress which is relevant to shareholders as well as debtholders and other creditors, but does not require an estimate of the lower tail. The binary dependent variable equals one if nancial institutions have a survivorship-adjusted buy-and-hold return of -80% or worse, and zero otherwise. With returns adjusted for survivorship bias, the variable distinguishes surviving banks and banks delisted after a value-increasing takeover from distressed banks and banks delisted after a government-backed takeover or a bankruptcy. Results after reestimating Eq. (2) in a probit framework are presented in Columns 7 and 8 of Table 3 .
The coecients on CEO and CFO inside debt are negative and signicant suggesting a negative impact on the probability of shareholder and debtholder distress. Unreported 
Investment policy: Real estate lending and writedowns
First, on the asset side of the bank's balance sheet, banks built substantial exposure to the subprime loans that set o the crisis. Subprime mortgages are risky assets as they continue to have a balance remaining after all the scheduled payments are paid, and need renancing at an appreciated home price to avoid a jump in the mortgage rate. Therefore, when house prices fall, subprime borrowers may no longer be able to renance and risk foreclosure.
This deteriorates the quality of a bank's real estate portfolio that increasingly consists of nonperforming assets, i.e., non-accrual loans in which payment of interest or principal is unlikely or the borrower has fallen behind in interest payments, as well as foreclosed and repossessed properties.
Hence, if inside debt induces bank managers to preserve rm value, I expect a signicant relation between inside debt holdings and the quality of the bank's real estate portfolio during the crisis. The fraction of low-quality real estate is proxied by nonperforming assets on real estate which consists of non-accrual loans that are considered impaired as the payment of interest or principal is doubtful, plus other real estate owned assets which represents properties acquired through foreclosure and repossession that serve as a total or partial repayment of a loan.
13
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 Table 4 show that CEO and CFO inside debt holdings are negatively correlated to writedowns scaled by total assets (p < 0.03 for CEOs, p < 0.01 for CFOs).
The statistical signicance of inside debt further increases when writedowns are expressed in dollar terms (unreported to conserve space). Hence, the evidence on the fraction of lowquality real estate and writedowns is consistent with the assertion that inside debt encourages managers to invest more conservatively.
13 See, for instance, Northern Trust's 2010 annual report, page 56.
4.2
Financing policy: Pre-crisis borrowing
On the liability side of the bank's balance sheet, additional risk was taken by funding assets mostly by short-term market borrowing (Acharya et al. (2009) ). Since a bank's balance sheet is continuously marked to market, increases (decreases) in the value of the asset portfolio appear immediately as increases (decreases) in net worth of the bank, allowing (requiring) nancial intermediaries to increase (decrease) the dollar value of debt (Adrian and Shin (2010)). Several papers argue that the active management of banks' balance sheets increases aggregate volatility, the price of risk, and the probability of nancial distress during the nancial crisis (e.g., Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) 14 Hence, if higher leverage increases the probability of default and inside debt encourages managers to avoid default, I expect that a negative relation exists between inside debt holdings and growth in bank debt. A straightforward measure for growth in bank debt would be the increase in market leverage. However, because leverage appears in the denominator of the inside debt measures, any documented association between inside debt and nancial leverage could be driven by a mechanical relationship. Therefore, I examine proportional growth in repurchase agreements (repos) to proxy for balance sheet expansion, which is arguably a more important channel for banks to raise debt (e.g., see Adrian and Shin (2010) ).
In a repurchase agreement, a bank sells a security in order to buy it back at a pre-agreed price on a xed future date. Hence, a repo is equivalent to a collateralized loan with interest being the excess of the repurchase price over the sale price. I measure balance sheet expansion by the proportional change in repurchase agreements from December 2006 to alleviate concerns about endogeneity between inside debt and leverage policy, and until July 2007 to isolate 14 An important explanation is that, when mortgage values eroded in 2007 and 2008, banks needed to deleverage their positions by selling part of the assets. The sales occurred when the prices of these assets were low, and led to even lower prices. This raised concerns with other banks about the solvency and liquidity of the banking system, and margin and collateral requirements were increased. Due to these tightened lending standards, banks could no longer roll over their short-term debt leading to further assets sales and deeper losses.
balance sheet expansion from changes in bank borrowing due to the crisis.
Columns 5 and 6 of Another possible policy implication is that the eect of inside debt is the strongest when the potential for risk-shifting towards debtholders is the largest, i.e., when leverage is high.
To examine this, I split the sample at the median leverage ratio and re-run the key regressions in Tables 2 and 3 Columns 7 and 8 of Table 4 present the coecient estimates on total non-interest income.
As expected, larger holdings of 2006 inside debt are signicantly associated with a lower percentage of income from non-traditional banking activities, with each of the coecients signicant at better than the 5% level.
This evidence is consistent with the idea that CEOs
and CFOs with larger inside debt holdings stick to traditional lines of business, and are less involved in fee-based banking.
Endogenous choice of inside debt compensation
Any form of managerial compensation is likely to be inuenced by a bank's business environment, its riskiness, and the nature of the agency problems that compensation is to address.
In the context of this paper, banks could set inside debt remuneration while simultaneously having future bank risk in mind, which may result in a negative relation between inside debt and bank risk that is spurious rather than causal. Another alternative explanation for the negative relation between inside debt and bank risk is that more inside debt is awarded by banks that are less vulnerable to crises or operate in a more stable business environment.
This seems especially valid in this cross-sectional study, which does not purge xed eects as in a panel data setup.
Such concerns are partially addressed by measuring changes in share prices (i.e., returns), as in Table 2 another. These features reduce the endogeneity problem that arises from a simultaneous determination of inside debt and bank risk.
Instrumental variables
To alleviate endogeneity concerns more directly, I re-estimate the various instances of Eq.
(2) using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression model. One previously used instrument (see, for instance, Cassell et al. (2012) ) that seems reasonably exogenous is executive age since pension value mechanically increases with age, and it is relatively dicult to argue that the exclusion restriction is violated. (2007); Billett and Qian (2008) ).
Next, empirical ndings that document a positive correlation between age and risk aversion are plagued by various identication problems as risk-aversion is generally aected by time-specic developments (e.g., current and past recessions). Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) identify these problems and nd that the correlation between age and risk aversion disappears once these issues are addressed: older individuals do not gradually allocate lower fractions of their wealth into (risky) equities.
Finally, in studies that focus specically on bank executives, age has no signicant eect on a variety of bank performance measures (Tung and Wang (2010); Bennett et al. (2012) ),
and CEOs with experience of earlier crises do not manage more conservatively in (pre-) crisis years (Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) ).
The rst-stage and second-stage results are presented in panels A and B of Table 5, respectively. In the relatively small sample of banks, the impact of inside debt on volatility, VaR, and ES is predominantly signicant around conventional levels for CFOs (p < 0.14),
but not for CEOs (p < 0.41). This holds to a lesser extent for the impact of inside debt on buy-and-hold returns for CEOs (p < 0.08) and CFOs (p < 0.03). The online appendix shows that once possibly collinear variables are removed, the standard errors decrease further to conventional signicance levels for CFOs (p < 0.10 across all dependent variables in Table   5 ), but again not for CEOs (p < 0.48 across all dependent variables in Table 5 ). This dierence in coecients between CEOs and CFOs is noteworthy: if some omitted variable is responsible for the results in panel B even after instrumenting inside debt, then it must aect CEOs' and CFOs' incentives in dierent ways to produce these dierent results. This rules out many omitted variables. For instance, a more stable business environment is unlikely to aect compensation to CFOs but not to CEOs.
While most estimated coecients in panel B of Table 5 have the expected signs and signicance levels, the 2SLS-estimated coecients on CFO inside debt are insignicant for CoVaR (p < 0.27 in the main text and the online appendix). For that reason, even though the high p-values may reect the innately less precise 2SLS estimator rather than a spurious, endogenously driven eect of inside debt, I interpret the result on CoVaR with more care.
Nevertheless, the bits of evidence presented so far increase condence in the consistency and validity of the OLS results.
CEOs and CFOs with and without inside debt
Finally, one may be concerned that pension benets and deferred compensation are not always awarded: Panel B of (2009)). In addition, statistical procedures that address selection bias do so for selection in outcome variables rather than explanatory variables (e.g., Tobin (1958), Heckman (1979) , or the partial identication methods in Manski (1990) some of the inside debt that an executive builds up from NQDC is discretionary, it could be that the NQDC part of inside debt depends on the executive's view of future default risk.
Therefore, I also create an indicator variable for whether CEOs and CFOs hold any pensions as there is less discretion for accumulating pensions than for annually awarding NQDC. Table 6 presents results after re-running the main regressions on the extended sample. 
Conclusion
In order to discourage risk-taking behavior fueled by executive compensation, legislators amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to address moral hazard between managers and shareholders. This presumes that the monitoring of risk will be more eective once more power is assigned to shareholders.
This paper examines incentives that address the debtholder rather than shareholder agency problem. It discusses how bank risk is aected by awarding executives with debtbased executive pay, which consists of dened benet pensions and deferred compensation (inside debt). Using a sample of CEOs and CFOs in small and large U.S.-listed banks, the results in this paper demonstrate that higher inside debt holdings are associated with systematically less bank risk during the crisis. In addition, inside debt holdings are negatively correlated to several bank-specic risk-taking channels. This suggests that inside debt limits bank losses incurred in crisis times by encouraging more conservative decision-making.
The results have clear implications for the evaluation of current regulatory reforms and the broader public policy issue of how to limit the risks surrounding nancial institutions. For example, the documented link between inside debt and bank risk suggests that creditors are more inclined to monitor bank risk than shareholders. As a consequence, the strengthening of shareholder governance that is now implemented in many countries may not necessarily be the most eective tool for limiting risk. portfolio and all her individual tranches of options held, summed to an aggregate total, for a $1 increase in the stock price (1% increase in stock volatility). Awarded stock is assumed to have a vega of zero and a delta of one and equals the number of (unearned or unvested) shares, plus those that are owned or have been awarded through an equity incentive plan. The Black-Scholes value of each option tranche is estimated using the exercise price and remaining option life from Equilar, the stock price from Compustat, the risk-free rate that best corresponds to the option's time to maturity from CRSP, annualized daily volatility estimated over three years, and the dividend yield dened as annual cash dividends divided by share price. The value of inside debt is accumulated pensions plus the balance of non-qualied deferred compensation (Balance NQDC). The executives' inside debt-equity (D/E) ratio (Executive D/E ratio) equals the value of inside debt divided by the total value of shares and options owned. The k-ratio equals the personal debt-equity ratio divided by the rm's external debt-equity ratio. Panel C presents correlations amongst inside debt and all control variables. in italics) based on standard errors that are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% signicance levels, respectively.
Stock market losses
Total volatility based on standard errors that are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% signicance levels, respectively. 
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